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Quantum Meruit and Building Contracts* 
H O Hunter and J W Carter 
PART I—THE QUANTUM MERUIT CONCEPT 
Introduction 
The aim of this article is to discuss the restitutionary principles applicable to 
quantum meruit claims in building contracts. In the first part we consider the 
concept itself and identify the contexts in which such a claim is pursued. In 
the second part of the article, to be published in the next issue of the JCL, 
attention is directed, principally, to one issue, namely whether the contract 
price constitutes a ceiling on the amount recoverable under a quantum meruit 
claim following breach by the defendant. 
Prior to the sixteenth century, English law did not provide a remedy for 
a party who rendered services for the benefit of another party unless the parties 
had agreed to a sum in advance. This was true even though the circumstances 
suggested a presumption of payment.1 In the seventeenth century, however, 
a type of assumpsit known as 'quantum meruit' developed to allow recovery 
in many such situations. By allowing the recovery of 'so much as he deserves' 
the action, with its close relation 'quantum valebat' (or 'quantum valebant'), 
led to the recovery of reasonable sums for the value of services rendered or 
goods supplied. Thus, for example, a builder could recover a reasonable sum 
for work done even though there was no agreement on price. The seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries then saw the evolution and development of that branch 
of the law known as 'quasi-contract'.2 Allocated to it were those causes of 
action, recognised by the common law, which were neither contractual nor 
tortious, including the action for quantum meruit. 
In Moses v Macferlan3 Lord Mansfield expressed the basis for the action 
by stating that the defendant 'in the circumstances of the case, is obliged by 
the ties of natural justice and equity' to pay the plaintiff. The law was, or 
became, much more technical than Mansfield's comment indicated. Implied 
contract was the theory of quasi-contract which appealed to the English judges 
in the nineteenth century, and liability was therefore based on an implied 
promise to pay the sum which the plaintiff ultimately recovered. The notion 
of implied promise contained an ambiguity which, whilst perhaps giving the 
law an element of flexibility, has hindered the development of the modern 
* This article is a revised version of a two part seminar staged by the Committee for Postgraduate 
Studies (Faculty of Law, University of Sydney) in 1988. The authors are grateful to Ms Anne 
Duffield for researching various aspects of the article. We are also grateful to Ms Carolyn 
Needham, barrister and Mr Terry Burke, solicitor, for their comments at the seminar. 
1 C H S Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law, 1949, p 360. 
2 Compare A W B Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract, 1975, p 489. 
3 (1760) 2 Burr 1005; 97 ER 676. 
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law. Was the promise implied in the sense that it was the subject of a genuine, 
though tacit agreement, or was it implied in the sense that it arose independently 
of the intentions of the parties?4 In other words, was the promise implied in 
fact or merely imposed? The search for a comprehensive answer to this question 
was rendered impossible by a legal fiction, namely that even in cases where 
there was no tacit agreement, the basis of liability was an implied contract. 
Part and parcel of the development of the law of quasi-contract was the 
invention of the 'common counts'. There were a number of these, but the 
relevant one is the count for 'work done'. By the end of the seventeenth century 
it was sufficient pleading for the plaintiff to declare that the defendant was 
indebted to the plaintiff in so much money for work and labour done and 
performed at the request of the defendant. Within the 'framework', to use 
Fifoot's5 word, of indebitatus assumpsit a series of simple forms of pleading 
evolved to accommodate a variety of claims which were very commonly 
brought to recover liquidated sums. They survived in England until the 
Common Law Procedure Act 1852 (UK). The reason for their demise was 
the practice of invoking large numbers of these counts in a single action when 
the pleader was not prepared to select the right one. Telling the same tale in 
a number of slightly different ways was thought to be the safest way of ensuring 
success. No doubt certain fact situations were ambiguous, and difficulty could 
be perceived in deciding whether a builder should proceed on a count for work 
done rather than for goods supplied, but the indiscriminate pleading led to the 
publication of New Rules of Pleading in the Hilary Term of 1834 that confined 
the plaintiff to a single count. The new rules proved to be disastrous, because 
they led to constant nonsuits. 
The Act of 1852 abolished special pleading and the common counts, but 
the terminology of the common counts and quantum meruit continued to be 
employed. The law of quasi-contract developed, but slowly, and the law of 
restitution emerged. Whether we can truly say that there is a law of restitution 
today is to some an open question. However, this article proceeds on what 
now appears to be the generally accepted view today: that a subject called 
restitution exists and that it contains the law of quasi-contract and a collection 
of other common law and equitable bases of liability. What is debatable is 
whether there exists a unifying element in the law. Although the debate here 
is much broader than the subject envisaged by this article, we can examine 
whether a unifying element exists in the specific area of quantum meruit in 
building contracts. 
Examination of building contracts involves a discussion of the availability 
of quantum meruit as a legitimate claim for services rendered. Professor Birks 
has stated6 the requirements of quantum meruit in cases where a contract 
analysis fails: (a) the recipient must have requested or acquiesced in the 
4 See C H S Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law, 1949, p 367. American courts 
have tried to deal with this problem by distinguishing between 'implied-in-fact' contracts and 
'implied-in-law' contracts. The former are based on the parties' actions. The promise is implied 
because the parties acted as if there was a promise even if there had not been any explicit 
promise. An implied in law contract develops from principles of justice. 
5 C H S Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law, 1949, p 368. 
6 Peter Birks, 'Restitution for Services', [1974] CLP 12 at 30. 
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doing of the work; (b) the recipient must have known that the work was not 
intended to be gratuitous; and (c) the events which have happened must not 
be events whose risks were borne by the plaintiff. Professor Jones' requirements 
are superficially simpler. In his view7 a defendant who has been 'unjustly 
enriched' by benefits obtained at the plaintiff's expense must pay for them. 
The decision in Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul8 is important because of 
the prominence given to unjust enrichment as a restitutionary concept. There 
Deane J described9 unjust enrichment as a 'unifying legal concept which 
explains why the law recognises, in a variety of distinct categories of case, 
an obligation on the part of the defendant to make fair and just restitution for 
a benefit derived at the expense of a plaintiff and which assists in the 
determination, by the ordinary processes of legal reasoning, of the question 
whether the law should, in justice, recognise such an obligation in a new or 
developing category of case'. The question which we can also explore is the 
extent to which the concept, and the decision in Pavey itself, requires or justifies 
a re-evaluation of quantum meruit situations. 
Analysis and Assumptions 
A current analysis must begin with Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul. It has 
implications for four types of claims likely to be made in building contract 
cases: (1) contracts which fail to materialise; (2) ineffective contracts; (3) 
contracts discharged for breach or repudiation; and (4) frustrated contracts. 
There are certain assumptions that restrict our analysis in this paper. First, 
if there is a contract between the parties it will be assumed that there is some 
feature that makes it impossible for the builder to claim on the contract. 
Accordingly, this paper is not concerned with contractual quantum meruit 
claims that arise because the parties by their contract stipulated that a reasonable 
sum would be paid for the work done. This excludes 'cost plus' contracts which 
have been performed by the builder, and most situations in which the builder 
makes a claim for extras agreed to by the customer. Secondly, it is assumed 
that the builder has not done the work in question officiously. That is to say 
we will only be concerned with cases in which the builder has been requested 
to do the work or it has been assumed that work would be done. 
Pavey v Matthews 
In Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul the appellant (the builder) had sued to 
recover a sum of $26,945.50 which was alleged to be due under a building 
contract. The claim could not be framed in contract, and was not so framed, 
due to noncompliance with s 45 of the Builders Licensing Act 1971 (NSW). 
The claim was in fact in the nature of a quantum meruit to recover the 
reasonable value of the work, assessed by deducting $36,000 paid from the 
market value, namely $62,945.50. The work had been requested by the 
7 See Gareth Jones, 'Restitutionary Claims for Services Rendered', (1977) 93 LQR 273. 
8 (1987) 162 CLR 221. See Gareth Jones, 'Restitution: Unjust Enrichment as a Unifying Concept 
in Australia?', (1988) 1 JCL 8; David Ibbetson, 'Implied Contracts and Restitution: History 
in the High Court of Australia', (1988) 8 Oxford J Legal Stud 312. 
9 (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 256-7. 
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respondent (Ms Paul), and it was to be done under an oral contract to pay 
a reasonable remuneration, calculated by reference to prevailing rates in the 
industry. But s 45 required the contract to be written. It provided that a contract 
under which the holder of a licence undertakes to carry out (or vary) any 
building work is 'not enforceable against the other party to the contract unless 
the contract is in writing signed by each of the parties'. The appellant held 
a licence, and the work was 'building work' under the Act and so s 45 applied. 
So much was agreed by the parties who consented to Enderby J making an 
order for the trial (as a preliminary issue) of whether s 45 defeated the claim. 
Clarke J held in favour of the builder and ordered the remaining issues to be 
tried before an arbitrator. That decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal 
which held10 that the quantum meruit, framed as an indebitatus count, was 
an action to enforce the contract.11 It was also said to be inconsistent with 
the legislative policy of the Builders Licensing Act 1971 for the claim to 
succeed. An appeal was then taken to the High Court which held, by a majority 
of four to one (Brennan J dissenting) that the Court of Appeal was wrong.12 
Two questions arose in the High Court. First, was the action brought an 
action on the contract? If this was the position the claim had to fail because 
s 45 rendered the contract between the parties unenforceable. If not then a 
second question would arise, viz, was the scope of s 45, or the policy behind 
the provision, inconsistent with the maintenance of the claim? Much of the 
discussion in the case is historical, and answers the first question by considering 
the nature of the quantum meruit and the indebitatus assumpsit proceeding. 
In large part this results from the manner in which the Court of Appeal handled 
the case. However, it does give the case a rather odd emphasis. Given the 
nature of the proceedings, and the abolition of forms of action, one would 
have expected a much more direct analysis of the scope of s 45. In dealing 
with the second question the High Court draws a distinction between legislation 
derived from the Statute of Frauds 1677 (Imp) and legislation such as was 
considered by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Deposit & Investment 
Ltd v Kaye13—the Money-lenders and Infant Loans Act 1941 (NSW). If the 
Builders Licensing Act were analogous to the former the action would succeed, 
aliter if s 45 were analogous to the latter. 
Mason and Wilson JJ14 expressed the distinction between the two types of 
legislation, alluded to above, by posing two possible meanings for 'enforceable' 
and 'unenforceable'. The reference, they said, may be 'either to the judicial 
or curial remedies for the enforcement of a contract, including such remedies 
as the contract may provide'. They thought the words of s 45 apt to embrace 
indirect as well as direct enforcement of the contract, but pointed out that the 
question remained whether the action brought was an indirect enforcement of 
the contract. They then expressed their agreement with Deane J that the right 
to recover on the quantum meruit did not depend on the existence of an implied 
contract. Moreover, it was not enough for the appellant to prove execution 
10 See Paul v Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 114. 
11 The same views were expressed in Schwarstein v Watson (1985) 3 NSWLR 134. 
12 Effectively Schwarstein v Watson (1985) 3 NSWLR 134 is also overruled. 
13 (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 453. 
14 (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 226-7. 
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of the building contract and non-payment. For the quantum meruit to succeed 
there must be acceptance of the work. The obligation so enforced 'differs in 
character'15 from the contractual obligation which would have been enforceable 
in the event of compliance with s 45. 
So far as policy was concerned, Mason and Wilson JJ thought the 
interpretation contended for by the respondent so 'draconian' that they were 
reluctant to hold that such was the intention of the legislature. Finding no 
genuine guidance from the terms of the Act, Mason and Wilson JJ turned to 
a Queensland decision, Gino D'Alessandro Constructions Pty Ltd v Powis at 
that time unreported, but since reported.16 The court said that the purpose of 
broadly similar legislation in that State was the introduction of a degree of 
precision often lacking in such contracts, but necessary for the determination 
of whether loss or damage has been suffered so as to attract the benefit of 
insurance under the Act. 
Deane J delivered the main judgment. He began by pointing out that if the 
respondent (and Court of Appeal) was correct a builder who discharged all 
the contractual obligations would be able to recover nothing if, even though 
quite innocent of any evil intent, the builder had failed to ensure satisfaction 
of s 45. His Honour also noted the oppression which would or might follow 
from the ability of the customer to enforce even an oral contract against the 
builder. He was not convinced that this was intended to be the position. 
Deane J approved Jordan CJ's statement of the law of quasi-contract in 
Horton v Jones (No 1).17 Jordan CJ had said: 
(1) The fact that consideration is executed is not enough to render the Statute of 
Frauds inapplicable. 
(2) The statute will not apply where benefits flowing from acts in performance of 
a contract are accepted. That is to say, if the recipient has behaved in relation to 
them in such a way that in the absence of a contract the supplier could sue upon 
the common money counts. The statute would not preclude prosecution of an 
indebitatus claim to obtain reasonable remuneration. 
(3) Although unenforceable, the express contract prevents the implication of a new 
contract, in respect of which special assumpsit could be maintained. Consequently, 
at best the unenforceable contract can be referred to as evidence of the remuneration 
recoverable under an indebitatus claim. 
(4) Debt is available, in the form of indebitatus assumpsit, to obtain reasonable 
remuneration. 
These propositions show that Jordan CJ regarded the claim in indebitatus 
assumpsit as independent of any genuine agreement upon which a special count 
could be framed. The obligation to pay, Jordan CJ, Rogers and Owen JJ 
explained in Horton v Jones (No 2),18 is 'imposed by law, and does not 
depend on an inference of an implied promise'. This meant, Deane J went 
on to explain, that there was no need to resort to the fictional promise of 
assumpsit to explain why the Statute of Frauds did not preclude the action 
to recover reasonable remuneration as a liquidated sum. 
15 (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 228. 
16 [1987] 2 Qd R 40. 
17 (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 359 at 367-8 (approved Phillips v Ellinson Bros Pty Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 
221 at 246). 
18 (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 305 at 320. 
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It was also necessary to consider certain views of Lord Denning, expressed 
extra-judicially19 and judicially.20 His views were, Deane J said,21 subject to 
three criticisms. First, the obligation enforced arises independently of and is 
not derived from the unenforceable agreement. Secondly, the fictional assumpsit 
could not alter the reality that an action on an indebitatus count could be brought 
on the agreement, even though the pleader chose to enforce the fictional promise 
to pay rather than the debt. Thirdly, under the modern law, the basis of the 
obligation to make payment for an executed consideration given and received 
under an unenforceable contract is restitution or unjust enrichment. 
His Honour went on to explain why, under the traditional approach Jordan 
CJ was correct in Horton v Jones. The old common indebitatus count was used 
to accommodate two distinct categories of claim: 
(1) to recover a debt arising under a genuine contract whether: 
(a) express or 
(b) implied; and 
(2) to recover a debt owing in circumstances where the law itself imposed or 
imputed an obligation or promise to make compensation for a benefit accepted. 
In (1) the action is on the contract, and this was so whether it took the form 
of a 'special' or a 'common' count. On the other hand, in (2), although common 
lawyers have tended to speak in terms of an implied contract, the action is 
not based on a genuine agreement at all. Accordingly, a valid and enforceable 
agreement would preclude such a claim. So, (2) is available where there is 
no applicable genuine agreement or where the agreement is frustrated, avoided 
or unenforceable. Indeed, as Deane J pointed out,22 it is the absence of a genuine 
agreement or the fact that it is not applicable, frustrated, avoided or 
unenforceable 'that provides the occasion for (and part of the circumstances 
giving rise to) the imposition by law of the obligation to make restitution'. 
Because the claim made in the context of the Statute of Frauds belongs in (2) 
it is maintainable and not regarded as an action on the contract. He agreed 
with Denning LJ's revised judgment in James v Thomas H Kent & Co Ltd.23 
On the legislative intent, Deane J thought it important that the Act did not 
render the contract void or illegal. He could find no intention to deprive the 
builder of the ordinary common law right. Moreover, the builder was not as 
of right entitled to recover what the customer had agreed to pay. The right 
was to recover fair and reasonable restitution for the benefit of the work actually 
done, and which had been accepted. 
Deane J also expressed some views on calculation of the payment. He said 
that the contract may be referred to and hinted that it might24 be regarded as 
the limit of recovery. However, it is also legitimate to have regard to any 
19 A T Denning, 'Quantum Meruit and the Statute of Frauds' (1925) 41 LQR 79 at 85 (see also 
'Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd, (1939) 55 LQR 54). See further, 
below, text at n 27. 
20 James v Thomas H Kent & Co Ltd [1950] 2 All ER 1009 (approved Turner v Bladin (1951) 
82 CLR 463). 
21 (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 253-5. 
22 (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 256. 
23 [1951] 1 KB 551 at 556. 
24 (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 257. 
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detriment sustained by reason of the builder's failure to comply with the Act.25 
Dawson J's judgment is much shorter, and more traditional in approach. 
Briefly, he reasoned as follows. First, assumpsit was delictual in nature and 
when used as an alternative to debt, the basic notion was a promise to pay. 
Secondly, this promise was not that contained in the agreement, but was rather 
a separate and subsequent promise to pay. Thirdly, debt was not an action 
to enforce payment pursuant to a contract: it was more in the nature of a 'real' 
action. Fourthly, later, when the promise to pay came to be implied or inferred 
from the circumstances, the form known as indebitatus assumpsit came to 
supplant debt, and was distinguishable from the other form of assumpsit in 
which the action was for breach of the promise. Fifthly, the common indebitatus 
counts, such as quantum meruit, offered a remedy where there was an express 
agreement which could not be enforced, provided that the agreement was 
completely executed or performed so that the promise to pay (a non-contractual 
promise) could be implied. Sixthly, these common counts rested on a promise 
implied in fact, rather than a fictitious promise, and were distinguishable from 
those cases in which indebitatus assumpsit was held to lie as a remedy in quasi-
contract based on a promise implied in law to prevent unjust enrichment. 
Seventhly, it followed that the action on a quantum meruit was not an action 
on an implied contract, or at least not on an implied contract covering the same 
ground as the express contract. Therefore, disagreeing with Mason and Wilson 
JJ and Deane J, he considered Turner v Bladin,26 and Denning LJ's original 
views in James v Kent,27 to be correct. Finally, he could find nothing in the 
legislation at issue to preclude the action and agreed with Mason and Wilson JJ. 
To conclude this lengthy analysis we turn to Brennan J's dissenting judgment. 
He saw a plaintiff who has fully performed as being faced with the choice 
of recovering the agreed sum by action on the contract or to recover the debt 
arising on performance. The action for damages—in its original indebitatus 
form—was based on a subsequent and separate promise to pay. Judgment in 
debt led to recovery of the precise amount of the debt. These actions were 
not founded on the contract. The Statute of Frauds did not preclude the 
indebitatus claim when based on the fictional promise to pay the debt. However, 
Brennan J thought that a quasi-contractual obligation to pay could not be implied 
in respect of a subsisting unwritten contract within the Statute of Frauds. Only 
if execution of the contract gave rise to a debt could the plaintiff recover—he 
or she could in former times sue in debt, or in an action of indebitatus assumpsit. 
He took the view, however, that s 45 was not analogous to the Statute of Frauds. 
The contract was rendered unenforceable and an unenforceable contract 'cannot 
give rise to any legal remedy, whether curial or extra-curial'.28 It was thus 
25 Query, however, whether the way to do this is by arriving at a net sum, or by allowing a 
set-off or counter-claim. See Gareth Jones, 'Restitution: Unjust Enrichment as a Unifying 
Concept in Australia?', (1988) 1 JCL 8. For consideration of some of the measurement problems 
in American cases see H O Hunter, 'Measuring the Unjust Enrichment in a Restitution Case', 
(1989) 12 Syd L R 76. 
26 (1951) 82 CLR 463. 
27 [1951] 1 KB 551. 
28 (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 241. The point is well taken that courts should not just run rough 
shod over a statute in order to reach what seems to be a 'just' result. For a consideration 
of this issue in the context of Pavey and Matthews see David Ibbetson, 'Implied Contracts 
and Restitution: History in the High Court of Australia', (1988) 8 Oxford J Legal Stud 312 
at 326-7. 
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incapable of giving rise to a debt on which an action of debt or indebitatus 
assumpsit might be founded, and no claim for restitution was available. He 
also thought that to allow the appellant's claim would have been contrary to 
the plain words of that statute and could find nothing in the Queensland 
legislation to support a contrary view. 
Contracts which Fail to Materialise 
One of the 'growth areas' of contract law has been the invention of remedies 
to cope with the problems which arise when anticipated contracts fail to 
materialise. We have described this as an area of contract law because the 
courts view the problem as, at least in part, overcoming defects in the law 
of contract. Of course, the solutions are not contractual, but rather draw on 
estoppel, equity and restitution.29 In relation to anticipated building contracts 
a common problem is that the builder has done work for which no contractual 
remedy is available. It is reasonably common, for example, for services to 
be rendered pursuant to letters of intent under planned construction or building 
contracts. At the least the builder will want to claim the expense of that work 
and restitution is now an acknowledged source of compensation in respect of 
such expenditure. 
In essence the problem is a simple one: has the provider agreed to bear the 
risk that the contract will not be entered into? But, of course, the concept of 
risk is a slippery one and not itself a sufficient basis for deciding a legal issue 
which may involve the fate of an expenditure of millions of dollars. Thus, 
we can pose the question, 'In what circumstances will a quantum meruit be 
available to obtain restitution for such expenditure?' Notwithstanding the 
substantial developments which have occurred in this area it remains that a 
builder will not be permitted to recover simply because he or she has incurred 
expenses in the hope of obtaining a contract. Builders are still expected to bear 
costs of preparing quotations and tenders unless they have reached a contrary 
agreement enforceable as a contract. It is only when the builder's expenditure 
goes beyond normal expectations (having regard to the nature of the project 
anticipated) that the issue of recovery on a quantum meruit can arise.30 Thus, 
in William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis,31 Barry J found that work was done 
not in the hope that the building contract might ultimately be awarded, but 
under the belief, generated by the other party, that the contract would be 
awarded. A contract might not be awarded because the project does not go 
ahead, and the question arises whether a person's discretion may, in effect, 
be fettered by the quantum meruit. In Davis Barry J held that a quantum meruit 
claim could be made because the defendant had led the builder to believe 
that the project would go ahead.32 
29 The most significant of the recent cases is Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maker (1988) 
164 CLR 387. See K C T Sutton, 'Contract by Estoppel', (1989) 1 JCL 205. 
30 Compare Turriff Construction Ltd v Regalia Knitting Mills Ltd [1972] EG (Dig) 257 (letter 
of intent regarded as 'ancillary contract' for preparatory work). 
31 [1957] 1 WLR 932. 
32 It might be altogether more desirable to treat these cases as ones that involve detrimental reliance 
and seek to develop a more appropriate reliance based claim for recovery. See G Jones, 'Claims 
Arising Out of Anticipated Contracts Which Do Not Materialise', (1980) 18 U W Ontario 
L R 447. 
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Of the recent cases, we can start with Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney 
Municipal Council,33 where Sheppard J34 stated the following principle: 
. . . where two parties proceed upon a joint assumption that a contract will be 
entered into between them, and one does work beneficial for the project, and thus 
in the interests of the two parties, which work he would not be expected, in other 
circumstances, to do gratuitously, he will be entitled to compensation or restitution, 
if the other party unilaterally decides to abandon the project, not for any reason 
associated with bona fide disagreement concerning the terms of the contract to be 
entered into, but for reasons which, however valid, pertain only to his own position 
and do not relate at all to that of the other party. 
In 1969 the Council advertised that it planned to build a civic centre, and 
to award a building lease for development of the land in question. Tenders 
were called for and Sabemo was the successful tenderer. The purpose of the 
tender process, it seems, was merely to bring the council into a negotiating 
relationship with the successful tenderer. 
Sabemo prepared various schemes, at least one of which was satisfactory 
to all interested parties, but no contract was entered into even though 
development approval was given by the Council. Ultimately the Council decided 
to 'drop' the proposed scheme, and to work out a different scheme. Sabemo 
rendered an account of $426,000. However, the Council refused to pay and 
the action was brought to recover compensation or restitution. His Honour 
dealt solely with the issue of liability and held that the circumstance which 
in the instant case provided justification for holding the council liable was that, 
notwithstanding its own request that the work be done, the council deliberately 
decided to drop the proposal. Its unilateral decision, having nothing to do with 
the conduct of Sabemo or the quality of its work, could not deprive Sabemo 
of a right to payment. The position would (or at least might) have been different 
had the parties been unable to agree on a development scheme. 
The decision in British Steel Corp v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co 
Ltd35 illustrates that a quantum meruit may be available for work done under 
letters of intent. No contract arose because the parties were unable to agree 
on terms, but the work contemplated by the parties was done. In essence the 
problem was that BSC were not prepared to agree to the very onerous terms 
on CBE's standard form. It was clear that the work was not done gratuitously 
and Robert Goff J had little difficulty in saying that the work had to be paid 
for. It has been suggested36 that this type of decision suffers from the criticism 
that it throws the risk of incomplete negotiations on only one of the parties. 
In BSC, the buyers would, had there been a contract, have obtained protection 
against late delivery. The answer, however, may be that the valuation can 
33 [1977] 2 NSWLR 880. See J D Davies (1981) 1 Oxford J Legal Stud 300. 
34 [1977] 2 NSWLR 880 at 902-3. 
35 (1981) [1984] 1 All ER 504. See also OTM Ltd v Hydranautics [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 211. 
Contrast Hooker Corp Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (unreported), Supreme Court of NSW, 
30/10/87 (reversed on other grounds 20/9/88). Compare Nepean District Tennis Association 
Inc v Penrith City Council (unreported), Supreme Court of NSW, 24/10/88. 
36 S N Ball, 'Work Carried Out in Pursuance of Letters of Intent—Contract or Restitution?', 
(1983) 99 LQR 572. Compare J Beatson, 'Benefit, Reliance and the Structure of Unjust 
Enrichment', [1987] CLP 71 at 85-6; Ewan McKendrick, 'The Battle of the Forms and the 
Law of Restitution', (1988) 8 Oxford J Legal Stud 197. 
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take into account at least some such considerations. Moreover, there will be 
no quantum meruit if it is clear that the reason why no contract was agreed 
was the conduct of the builder. 
Ineffective Contracts 
Introduction 
The description 'ineffective contract' is not a precise one. It is being used here 
to encompass a range of defects, such as mistake, illegality', incapacity, failure 
to comply with a statutory requirement of writing and so on. Some of these 
defects lead to the conclusion that there is no contract at all, because it is void, 
for example because of uncertainty, others to the conclusion that the contract 
exists, but is unenforceable. The description is also sometimes used to describe 
contracts which have been rescinded or terminated. However, these situations 
are given separate treatment here.37 
Void Contracts 
In situations where the contract is void, say because it is incomplete or 
uncertain, a builder who has done work and thereby conferred benefits is in 
no worse position than where an anticipated contract fails to materialise, 
particularly if the work was done in the belief that there was a valid contract 
in existence. Absent some statutory provision, or illegality, work done must 
be paid for, in order to prevent unjust enrichment, because it was done at the 
request of the defendant. Indeed, it would not be unfair to say that the 
description 'void contract' is a contradiction. And its only value is to remind 
us of a background in which either or both the parties considered that there 
was a contract. Leaving aside any problems caused by illegality one would 
have thought that under the modern law there would not be much difficulty 
in allowing recovery. 
The leading case, a classic one in the law of restitution, is Craven-Ellis v 
Canons Ltd38 where the plaintiff claimed as on a quantum meruit for work: 
done, as valuer and estate agent for the defendants. The contract was void, 
but the Court of Appeal held that the quantum meruit was available. Greer 
LJ said39 that a promise to pay could be implied. It arose 'from the performance: 
of the services and the implied acceptance of the same by the company'. He 
emphasised that the promise was not a factual inference, but rather an inference 
'which a rule of law imposes on the parties where work has been done or goods 
have been delivered under what purports to be a binding contract, but is not 
so in fact'.40 Craven-Ellis was followed by Monahan J in Stinchcombe v 
Thomas,41 where the contract was held to be void for uncertainty. In Way v 
Latilla,42 the contract was ineffective because it was incomplete, the parties 
having failed to agree on price. It was clear that there was no contractual right 
37 See below, text at n 64 ff. 
38 [1936] 2 KB 403. 
39 [1936] 2 KB 403 at 409. 
40 See also [1936] 2 KB 403 at 412. 
41 [1957] VR 509. See also Flett v Deniliquin Publishing Co Ltd [1964-5] NSWR 383. 
42 [1937] 3 All ER 759. See also Flett v Deniliquin Publishing Co Ltd [1964-5] NSWR 383. 
Compare Monks v Poynice Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 662. 
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to payment for services rendered: there was no basis for implying a term to 
complete the contract. However, the House of Lords considered that there was 
an implied contract because the circumstances clearly indicated that the services 
were not intended to be gratuitous and most of the discussion is as to how 
the quantum meruit was to be quantified. The terms of the agreement, though 
incomplete, were admissible in evidence on this point. The same result was 
reached in Peter Lind & Co Ltd v Mersey Docks and Harbour Board43 where 
a building contract was incomplete due to the parties' failure to agree on price. 
Unenforceable Contracts 
There are many more cases on restitution in the context of unenforceable 
contracts. Mainly these have been in the context of contracts which do not 
comply with requirements of writing derived from or analogous to those stated 
in the Statute of Frauds 1677 (Imp). There are, of course, other reasons for 
unenforceability and we have become familiar in recent years with many 
statutory regimes of registration of professional people and restrictions on 
contract forms, particularly in consumer contracts. Although many of these 
are directly analogous to the Statute of Frauds, others lie very much at the 
border between unenforceability simpliciter and unenforceability associated 
with illegality. This makes for an additional difficulty, namely a more serious 
element of public policy. 
Mention must be made of policy because we are concerned with claims which 
might have been available as contractual actions but for the fact that the contract 
has been rendered unenforceable by statute. Clearly, if the legislature has 
thought it appropriate to deny the action on the contract we cannot infer a 
restitutionary right without paying some regard to the statutory policy. The 
Statute of Frauds stated its own policy objective, or at least its raison d'etre 
namely, fraudulent practices and perjury which had accompanied actions on 
simple contracts. Accordingly, six classes of contract—or promises—were 
subjected to a requirement of writing. The list, from dispositions of land to 
contracts in consideration of marriage seems to have no unifying element. 
Professor Simpson44 has suggested as a unifying feature that prior to the statute 
those contracts would have been under seal and enforced by the action in 
covenant. The statute can then be seen as intended to substitute written evidence 
for deed. In this respect it was arguably a reaction against the growth of 
assumpsit where no particular form of evidence was required. It was, in other 
words, an attempt to control or restrict the new action. This may help to explain 
why it was never necessary for the contract to be in writing, written evidence 
was enough. And it might also be suggested that the intention was to control 
assumpsit rather than indebitatus assumpsit based on execution of the contract. 
Moreover, we know that the doctrine of part performance has always been 
a substantial gloss on the statute. The basic rationale of that doctrine is not 
too far removed from restitution. If there has been performance or acts recog-
nising the contract to such a degree that it would be fraud—equitable fraud— 
to allow the statute to be pleaded, justice is done by enforcing the contract.45 
43 [1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep 234. 
44 A W B Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract, 1975, p 610. 
45 Cf Ash Properties Pty Ltd v Pollnow (1987) 9 NSWLR 80 at 101 per Priestley JA. 
106 Journal of Contract Law 
Cases such as Matthes v Carter46 illustrate that quantum meruit claims are 
frequently maintainable. Matthes sued on an indebitatus count to recover £900 
for building work done, together with a sum of £93 for a few items of materials 
which he supplied. The District Court found that the contract between the parties 
was caught by s 54A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). The Full Court 
said this was clearly correct. The District Court also held that the quantum 
meruit could be pursued. The Full Court said that the District Court Judge 
was wrong to hold that because the contract was unenforceable a quantum 
meruit was available. The position, it was said,47 is that the express contract 
must be removed, either by rescission or for some other reason, because no 
contract can be implied while the express contract is extant, even if 
unenforceable. But, said the Full Court, the express contract will not be an 
obstacle where it has been discharged by performance. The action was 
described48 as being 'for debt based upon the executed contract and not on 
an implied contract. It is money which in justice ought to be paid for services 
rendered, the proper ground for it being not in contract but in restitution'. 
However, this did not lead to success for the claim at issue because the whole 
work was not done. But a new trial was ordered restricted to the indebitatus, 
count, to deal with two problems. First, there was an allegation that the claim 
was available because there had been an accepted repudiation. Secondly, the 
second part of the indebitatus claim had not been dealt with satisfactorily at 
the trial. Of course, a contract to do building work on land does not need to 
comply with the Statute of Frauds unless there is something in the contract 
which purports to confer an interest in the land. Even if the work is completed, 
the builder does not obtain any interest in the land unless conferred by the; 
contract. For example the builders in Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul could 
not lodge a caveat to prevent the land owner dealing with her property. But 
if there is a term in the contract which creates a charge over the land, in order 
to give the builder a caveatable interest, the contract must comply with s 54A.49 
The views expressed in Matthes v Carter are consistent with two important 
earlier authorities, Horton v Jones (No 1)50 and Phillips v Ellinson Bros Pty 
Ltd.51 Both these cases also accept the proposition that we have seen in other 
areas, namely that the contract price may be referred to as evidence of the 
value of the services rendered. The judgement of Jordan CJ in Horton v Jones 
also appears to stand for the proposition that if a partial performance is freely 
accepted52 the defendant will be obliged to pay even though the contract has 
not been fully performed. However, Matthes v Carter seems to proceed on 
the basis that only if the contract has been fully performed can the plaintiff 
recover. 
In Queensland it has been suggested that there is no objection in allowing 
46 (1955) 55 SR (NSW) 357. 
47 (1955) 55 SR (NSW) 357 at 362. 
48 (1955) 55 SR (NSW) 357 at 363. 
49 See Venios v Machon (unreported), Supreme Court of NSW, 25/7'88. 
50 (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 359. 
51 Phillips v Ellinson Bros Pty Ltd (1941) 65 CLR 221. See also Gino D 'Alessandro Constructions 
Pty Ltd v Powis [1987] 2 Qd R 40. 
52 See further on this concept below, text at n 74. 
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the quantum meruit in cases of substantial performance.53 The rationale for 
such a view would be that the law of contract allows a builder to recover the 
contract price if he or she has substantially performed, and this should be 
translated into a quantum meruit claim when the contract is unenforceable. 
However, there may be a serious objection to such reasoning. A contractor 
is not discharged by substantial performance since, assuming that there is a 
breach, he or she remains liable to pay damages to the other party. Now if 
the contract is unenforceable by both parties the claim for damages is not 
available. It may be doubted whether the doctrine of substantial performance 
applies where there is no valid cross claim, counter-claim or right of set-off.54 
If the contract is unenforceable by the builder, as in Pavey & Matthews Pty 
Ltd v Paul, justice can be done, but is there a general rule against allowing 
the quantum meruit except in cases of full performance? 
These cases are also part of a rather arid discussion about the views of Lord 
Denning. He wrote two articles on the quantum meruit.55 They are referred 
to by the Full Court in Matthes v Carter and, as we have already seen,56 have 
been very influential. But, as Denning LJ, he also expressed views in the Court 
of Appeal57, views adopted by the High Court in Turner v Bladin.58 Reference 
is made to both the Authorised Reports and the All England Law Reports 
because, in revising his judgment, he changed his position. Originally he said 
that if the plaintiff can show that he or she has fully performed, the action 
can be brought in debt and is available even though the contract is unenforceable 
by reason of the Statute of Frauds. But in the authorised version he stated that 
the action is for reasonable remuneration. The proper ground for the claim, 
he said, is not contract, but restitution. In Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul 
the High Court, by majority, accepted the revised version. The majority 
therefore disagreed with the High Court's earlier opinion in Turner v Bladin. 
This means that earlier cases, which followed Lord Denning's original views, 
proceed on an erroneous view of the law. It is doubtful, however, whether 
this implies that a builder can recover on a partially performed building contract 
to which the Statute of Frauds applies. The position, it is suggested, is that 
the builder must be able to show that the contract has been discharged, either 
by full performance or by valid termination, for breach or repudiation or under 
the doctrine of frustration.59 
According to the analysis in Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul, the statutory 
prohibition falls to be constrated with cases such as Deposit & Investment Co 
Ltd v Kaye.60 In that case the plaintiff, a licensed money-lender, was held 
53 See Gino D'Alessandro Constructions Pty Ltd v Powis [1987] 2 Qd R 40 at 58. Compare 
Pablo Pty Ltd v Bloore [1983] 1 Qd R 107 at 112. 
54 See J W Carter, Breach of Contract, 1984, para 694. 
55 A T Denning, 'Quantum Meruit and the Statute of Frauds', (1925) 41 LQR 79 at 85; A T 
Denning, 'Quantum Meruit: The Case of Craven-Ellis v Canosn Ltd; (1939) 55 LQR 54. 
56 Above, text at n 21. 
57 James v Thomas H Kent & Co Ltd, [1951] 1 KB 551 at 556; [1950] 2 All ER 1099 at 1103-4. 
58 (1951) 82 CLR 463. 
59 Gino D'Alessandro Constructions Pty Ltd v Powis [1987] 2 Qd R 40 was a case of partial 
performance where, on one view, the builder accepted the other party's repudiation. The case 
was approved by the High Court in Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221. 
60 (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 453. 
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to be unable to recover on counts for money received or money paid because 
of failure to comply with the Money-lenders and Infants Loans Act 1941 
(NSW). The plaintiff alleged that the contract had been repudiated and rescinded 
on that basis. The Full Court was prepared to assume that such rescission had 
occurred, and also that unjust enrichment is the basis for restitution in cases 
of money had and received and quantum meruit. Still, in the instant case the 
decision was adverse to the plaintiff. It was not 'against conscience' to quote 
Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour 
Ltd61 for the defendants to retain the money. It was, it should be noted, 
unnecessary to say that the contract was illegal.62 On the other hand, Conolly 
J said, in Williamson vDiab63 that non-compliance with s 54(5) of the Builder's 
Registration and Homeowners' Protection Act 1979 (Qld), which rendered 
the builder's contract illegal, would have precluded a quantum meruit claim 
even though the contract was executed. 
Contracts Discharged for Breach 
Introduction 
An issue of restitution arises, we will assume, whenever a plaintiff has conferred 
a benefit on the defendant for which he or she will not be paid. The inquiry 
is whether a refusal to order restitution would result in unjust enrichment. In 
some cases it is suggested that restitution is available even though no benefit 
has been conferred. However, one would think that it is wrong to regard 
reliance expenditure as per se raising an issue of restitution.64 
It is not hard to find the cause of problems of restitution in contract law. 
In lump sum building contracts full performance by the builder is usually 
regarded as a condition precedent to his or her right to recover the lump sum 
from the other party. The rule has its origin at a time when the courts were 
more concerned to answer the question 'whose turn first?' than with what we 
would regard as crucial, namely 'Is the performance in accordance with the 
contract?' There are two reasons for this. First, modern contracts state the 
order of performance, and if they do not we now know intuitively what the 
parties contemplate. Secondly, modern lawyers tend to answer the question 
by saying that it depends on whether there is a right to terminate the 
performance of the contract. For the modern contract lawyer, enforcement 
of the contract and termination are merely two sides of the one coin. Not so 
to the eighteenth century lawyers, because they did not regard termination as 
a necessary concept, due to the way in which contract issues were litigated. 
We do not have to go back into the history of the subject, but it is important 
to appreciate that the defects of the common law of contract in this area are 
traceable to the use of criteria which were originally devised to answer a 
different question. 
The idea that performance must be 'full' or 'complete' necessarily promotes 
61 [1943] AC 32 at 61. 
62 Cf Multo Pty Ltd v Craddock (unreported), Supreme Court of NSW. 11/3/88 (Auctioneers 
and Agents Act 1941 (NSW)). 
63 [1988] 1 Qd R 210. 
64 Cf Planché v Colburn (1831) 8 Bing 14; 131 ER 305. 
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the question 'full or complete in what respect'? It is doubtful whether the 
common law ever subscribed to the response 'in every respect'. But, as might 
be expected in view of the history of the tort of negligence which, like contract, 
was conceived of as an action of the case, the misfeasance/nonfeasance dis-
tinction was influential. Thus, as a general rule a plaintiff would fail if his 
or her performance was not finished, whereas failure was not guaranteed if 
the defect was in the quality of the performance. This gave rise, however, 
to rather peculiar results. For example, if a carrier of goods agrees to deliver 
the goods at a named port but delivers the cargo to a port other than that named 
nothing can be recovered, because the contract is entire: Metcalfe v Britannia 
Ironworks Co.65 Nevertheless, if less than the full cargo is delivered, recovery 
on a pro-rata basis is allowed: Ritchie v Atkinson.66 And if the cargo arrives 
in a damaged state the full freight is recoverable, provided there has been 
'substantial' performance: Dakin v Oxley.67 No doubt some of this refine-
ment—if that is the right word—was designed to prevent injustice, but it had 
no rational basis. However, the cases do indicate that the terminology of 'entire' 
contracts is inaccurate. It would be more correct to describe the relevant 
question as being whether the obligation breached was an entire one.68 
The twentieth century cases evidence a more general attempt to alleviate 
the strictness of the common law of contract. It has been said that if performance 
is 'substantial' the plaintiff can recover on the contract, notwithstanding a breach 
on his or her part. Most of the cases have involved building contracts.69 
Decisions such as Hoenig v Isaacs70 and Bolton v Mahadeva71 stand for the 
proposition that, if the builder has substantially performed the contract, the 
contract price may be recovered subject to a set-off, counter-claim or cross 
claim for damages for breach of contract. It applies as well to 'severable' 
contracts, where the price is payable for designated parts or segments of 
performance, to be separately paid for. 
There is, however, no genuine explanation for the doctrine of substantial 
performance. Its object may well be to prevent 'unjust' enrichment, but that 
is not the criterion for its application. In Bolton v Mahadeva the Court of 
Appeal decided that the contract was entire, but went on to consider whether 
there had been substantial performance, on the basis that if there was the plaintiff 
would have been able to recover the price stated in the contract. Yet, one would 
have thought that if the parties have agreed on complete performance, nothing 
less will do. Denning LJ's judgment in Hoenig v Isaacs takes this point, by 
saying that the doctrine operates only if the parties have not agreed that complete 
performance is required. This is not just an academic quibble. Denning LJ 
said that if complete performance is not required, the term stating this is a 
65 (1977) 2 QBD 423. 
66 (1808) 10 East 295; 103 ER 787. 
67 (1864) 15 CBNS 646; 143 ER 938. 
68 Steele v Tardiani (1946) 72 CLR 386. 
69 For a discussion of the origin and basis of the doctrine in this area see S J Stoljar, 'Substantial 
Performance in Building and Work Contracts', (1954-6) 3 WALR 293. 
70 [1952] 2 All ER 176. 
71 [1862] 1 WLR 1009. 
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condition for the breach of which the other party may terminate the contract.72 
Claims by Parties in Breach 
The classic case on partially executed contracts is Sumpter v Hedges73 The 
plaintiff agreed to build two houses and stables for the defendant for £565. 
Work with a value of £333 was done, and part of the price was paid. The 
builder then abandoned the contract as he had run out of money. The defendant 
finished the buildings himself, using certain loose building materials left behind. 
Judgment was given for the defendant in an action for work done and materials 
supplied. However, there was an order in the plaintiff's favour in respect of 
the loose materials used. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. 
The court stated the (now) traditional rationalisation, namely that no 'fresh 
contract' to pay could be implied when the work was abandoned. This has 
been treated as an analysis in terms of opportunity to reject the benefit of the 
work. Because the defendant had no choice whether to accept or reject the 
partially completed buildings he did not have to pay for the benefit conferred. 
However, he enjoyed such a choice in relation to the loose materials and 
therefore had to pay for them. Recently, Andrew Burrows74 has challenged 
this analysis of Sumpter and suggested that the concept of acceptance of benefit 
is not the key. It might seem that the decisions are manifestly the source of 
injustice, and indicative that 'unjust enrichment' is not a genuine explanation 
of restitution. But the argument is that the enrichment is not unjust unless the 
recipient has the choice whether to accept the benefit or not.75 If Burrows is 
right, the concept of unjust enrichment should not be dismissed on such a basis. 
The decision of the High Court in Steele v Tardiani76 is instructive, and a 
rare illustration of success by a party in breach. Steele employed the plaintiffs, 
who were released Italian internees during the second world war, to cut timber. 
Their performance was not in accordance with the contract, since they did 
not comply with a term specifying the dimensions of the timber. Moreover, 
their performance was not substantial. But they did cut 1500 tons of timber. 
The trial judge held that Steele was obliged to pay 'a fair estimate' of the value 
of the timber not of the correct dimensions but nevertheless accepted. The 
High Court held, first, that the contract was not an 'entire' contract. Rather 
it was 'infinitely divisible'77 with the contract price indicating the rate at which 
the cut timber was to be paid for. That did not help the plaintiffs very much 
because, as Dixon J said,78 'each divisible application of the contract is entire 
and is only satisfied by performance, not partial, but substantially complete'. 
72 The loose response of many American cases, and even one might say of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, is that the parties do not mean literally what they say, and, therefore, the courts may 
impose 'reasonable' undertandings in the circumstances. See, eg, Aesco Steel Inc v J A Jones 
Constr Co, 621 F Supp 1576 (E D La 1985) and see also Note, 'Commercial Law and the 
American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code,' 
(1987) 97 Yale L J 156. 
73 [1898] 1 QB 673. 
74 A S Burrows, 'Free Acceptance and the Law of Restitution', (1988) 104 LQR 576. 
75 See also Summers v The Commonwealth (1918) 25 CLR 144 (aff'd (1919) 26 CLR 180). 
76 (1946) 72 CLR 386. 
77 (1946) 72 CLR 386 at 401 per Dixon J. 
78 (1946) 72 CLR 386 at 401. 
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Clearly, in respect of timber not of the correct dimensions recovery on the 
contract was not possible. Secondly, in order to recover in respect of such 
timber the plaintiff had to show 'circumstances removing their right to 
remuneration from the exact conditions of the special contract'.79 This was 
Dixon J's expression of the way of avoiding the rule applied in Sumpter v 
Hedges. Thirdly, it is 'not enough that work has been beneficial',80 in this 
case by turning standing timber into valuable firewood. The evidence had to 
be examined to see the circumstances under which Steele obtained the benefit. 
The evidence showed that the point as to dimensions had only been taken late 
in the day (during cross-examination), and that he had stood by while the timber 
was cut and made no complaint, thereby allowing the plaintiffs to leave their 
employment under the impression that he was not insisting on the contract. 
Fourthly, in these circumstances the subsequent sale of the timber could be 
regarded as 'a taking of the benefit of the work and so, as involving either 
a dispensation from precise performance or an implication at law of a new 
obligation to pay the value of the work done'.81 Generally, however, the courts 
have been very willing to reject the argument that the defendant, in keeping 
his or her own property, has accepted a benefit.82 
Claims by Innocent Parties 
A claim for restitution may arise if the innocent party has fully or partially 
performed. Two questions then arise. First, must the performance be received 
by the other party in the sense of constituting an addition to the defendant's 
property or assets? Secondly, should the plaintiff be permitted to choose 
between restitution and damages? We can put to one side cases in which the 
plaintiff has fully performed prior to termination. Unless the contract was for 
some reason ineffective there is no need to justify the action for the price, 
assuming that the time for performance has arrived. The quantum meruit is 
contractual in character, and this is true even if the parties agreed that a 
reasonable price would be paid. Only if the plaintiff seeks to ignore a price 
fixed by the contract can an issue of restitution arise. 
The decision in Ettridge v Vermin Board of the District of Murat Bay83 
provides a nice contrast with Sumpter v Hedges. The plaintiff agreed to erect 
a fence for £37 per mile. The defendant defaulted in his obligation to supply 
materials, but the plaintiff, for a time, continued to perform. Eventually, after 
more disputes, he abandoned the contract. The Full Court held, on the 
assumption that the defendant has repudiated the contract, that the plaintiff 
could recover damages or restitution on a quantum meruit by accepting the 
repudiation.84 
The right of election referred to in Ettridge goes back a long way, but perhaps 
its origin in the modern cases is De Bernardy v Harding.85 It was there said 
79 (1946) 72 CLR 386 at 402. 
80 (1947) 72 CLR 386 at 402 per Dixon J. 
81 (1946) 72 CLR 386 at 405 per Dixon J. 
82 See, eg Cooper v Australian Electric Co (1922) Ltd (1922) 25 WALR 66; Forman & Co Pty 
Ltd v The Ship 'Liddesdsale' [1900] AC 190. 
83 [1928] SASR 124. 
84 See further [1930] SASR 210 at 215. 
85 (1853) 8 Ex 822; 155 ER 1586. 
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that the plaintiff could recover on a quantum meruit for work and labour when 
the defendant repudiated a contract under which the plaintiff was to sell tickets 
to see the funeral procession of the Duke of Wellington. Alderson B said that 
after the defendant's repudiation the plaintiff could either sue on the contract— 
for damages—or recover on a quantum meruit for work done, relying on a 
rescission of the contract. A modern illustration is Stevenson v Hook86 where 
a surveyor recovered the value of work done after a repudiation by the 
defendant. 
Many of the older cases, such as De Bernardy itself, use the word 'rescission' 
to describe termination. This is still true today, even though we now know, 
from cases such as McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd87 and Johnson v Agnew,88 
that 'rescission' ab initio is quite different from termination. So, we would 
see the choice as between (1) affirming the contract and suing for damages; 
(2) terminating the performance of the contract and claiming damages; and 
(3) terminating and claiming restitution. For restitution after breach rescission 
ab initio is neither necessary nor available. However, it seems fairly clear that 
in the older cases this was the type of rescission referred to. And this is true 
even in the modern cases, such as Brooks Robinson Pty Ltd v Rothfield.89 The 
plaintiff agreed to build a cocktail cabinet in the defendant's house and the 
defendant repudiated the contract after the cabinet was partially completed. 
The plaintiff sued to recover £91 for work done and materials supplied. The 
Victorian Full Court decided that the plaintiff had rescinded the contract and 
was entitled to recover on a quantum meruit without regard to the terms of 
the contract agreed. The case raises the question: 'Is the contract price, or 
rather a proportion of it, the measure of recovery?'90 
At various times there have been suggestions for reform of this area. In 1983 
the Law Commission recommended,91 by majority,92 that a new remedy be 
available when the contract has been discharged but the builder has no remedy 
at common law. The details of the proposal need not be considered. They have 
met with a considerable amount of criticism.93 The Law Reform Committee 
of South Australia94 has suggested a different type of reform. It thought the 
English model too complex and proposed a right of restitution for the partial 
performer, but subject to an 'unfettered discretion in the Court to refuse to 
order payment or to reduce the amount of the payment if it thinks just'.95 Most 
restitution lawyers would prefer to work out a solution based on general 
principles such as unjust enrichment and total failure of consideration than 
accept such an unfettered discretion. 
86 (1853) 8 Ex 822; 155 ER 1586. 
87 (1933) 48 CLR 457. 
88 [1980] AC 367. 
89 [1951] VLR 405. 
90 See Part II of this article. 
91 Pecuniary Restitution on Breach of Contract (Law Commission No 121). 
92 Brian Davenport QC could see no justification for the reform, pointing out that the main 
beneficiaries would be builders undertaking small jobs. In his view it would be wrong to take 
away from the ordinary householder the only real remedy for protection against the builder 
not completing the work, namely, withholding the final payment. 
93 See A S Burrows, (1984) 47 MLR 76; J W Carter, Breach of Contract, 1984, paras 694-5. 
94 Nineteenth Report, 1986. 
95 Nineteenth Report, p 21. 
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Frustration 
One would have thought that, given the neutrality of frustration, that is the 
fact that it arises independently of breach, a greater willingness would have 
been shown towards the allowance of restitutionary claims. In fact that has 
not proved to be the case. Ever since Cutter v Powell96 the courts, mainly 
under the influence of the implied contract theory, have refused to allow 
quantum meruit claims for benefits conferred prior to frustration. Cutter was 
an employment contract case. The leading case on building contracts is Appleby 
v Myers.91 The plaintiffs agreed to build and install 10 items of plant and 
machinery. After some were installed the defendant's premises burnt down 
and the contract was thereby frustrated. The plaintiffs' action to recover £419 
for work done and materials supplied failed. The risk of loss by frustration 
lay where it fell, the court said there was no basis for implying a fresh contract. 
The decision has been approved in Australia.98 In Appleby frustration destroyed 
the work done, there was no benefit remaining after frustration. It is therefore 
arguable that there was no basis for restitution anyway. The position may have 
been remedied by statute." 
The only situation where, it seems, the common law will countenance a claim 
on a quantum meruit after frustration is where work is done after the contract 
is frustrated. Thus, in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of 
New South Wales100 the High Court saw no objection to the contractors claiming 
a quantum meruit for work done after the construction contract was frustrated. 
In that case the contractors agreed to excavate the tunnels for the Eastern 
Suburbs Railway. The contract was frustrated when local residents obtained 
an injunction which had the effect of delaying the work. The contractors could 
not carry out blasting operations in the way contemplated by the contract, but 
the contract did not confer any right to remuneration for their increased costs. 
Because the work was done after frustration a quantum meruit was available. 
Perhaps we can now, after Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul, argue in favour 
of a second type of restitutionary claim, in respect of work done prior to 
frustration which remains, at least in part, of benefit to the defendant after 
frustration.101 Given the reasoning in Pavey, the only requirement, apart from 
the need for benefit, is an element of injustice. The traditional way of showing 
this would be through free acceptance by the defendant. This requirement is 
by no means necessarily satisfied. The problem which the builder will face 
is that the work will have been done on the defendant's land. There will, 
96 (1795) 6 TR 320; 101 ER 573. See S J Stoljar, 'The Great Case of Cutter v Powell', (1956) 
34 Can B Rev 288. 
97 (1867) LR 2 CP 651. 
98 See, eg Re Continental C & G Rubber Pty Ltd (1919) 27 CLR 194 at 201. 
99 It depends on how the frustration statutes will be interpreted. In NSW the Frustrated Contracts 
Act 1978 (NSW) seems to allow recovery of some remuneration. That is not, it seems, the 
position in England under the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 (UK). See BP 
Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 783 at 801 (aff'd without reference 
to the point [1981] 1 WLR 232; [1983] 2 AC 352). Cf Frustrated Contracts Act 1988 (SA), 
ss 3(3), (4), 7. 
100 (1982) 149 CLR 337. 
101 Compare Société Franco Tunisienne D'Armement v Sidermar SpA [1961] 2 QB 278 at 312-15 
(charterparty) (subsequently overruled on the basis that the contract was not frustrated). 
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in most cases, be a very strong argument that the defendant really had no choice 
but to accept the benefit conferred. Perhaps the best chance of success arises 
where the defendant asks for the work to be completed, but even here the builder 
would be well advised to ask for a new contract which provides for payment 
in respect of work already done. 
Conclusion 
What can we say by way of conclusion? Clearly we have not reached the end 
of the story by any means. The future of quantum meruit claims in building 
contracts and, indeed, the law of restitution generally depends on two main 
factors. First, the extent to which the courts are prepared to develop the concept 
of unjust enrichment. Secondly, whether the legislature will continue to impose 
solutions, as has been done in the context of frustration and as is threatened 
in the context of partially performed discharged contracts, where breach led 
to discharge. 
It is believed that the courts are perfectly capable of developing the law in 
a satisfactory way. Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul disposes of the need 
for an historical analysis. That is not to say that the problem does not remain 
a challenging one. The situations we have examined are difficult ones, lying 
at the borderland between contract and restitution. The courts must tread 
carefully, as there is always the danger of imposing solutions which the parties 
never contemplated. 
